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Beyond Moody: A Re-Examination
of Unreasonably Small Capital
LEE

B.

SHEPARD*

INTRODUCTION

Fraudulent conveyance laws have faded from the legal spotlight
following the aftermath of the leveraged buyout boom in the late i98os
and early 199os. In recent years, as the economy has improved, the
number of leveraged buyouts has increased,' fueled by aggressive
financing techniques such as second lien financing.' Mergers and
acquisitions are on the rise.3 Other types of corporate transactions that
can raise fraudulent conveyance issues are becoming more popular, such
as leveraged recapitalizations, spin-offs and certain internal corporate
reorganizations.4 Since directors and other fiduciaries are more aware of
their duties and personal exposure to liability than in the past, and

lenders are considerably less aggressive than they were at the peak of the
leveraged buyout (LBO) craze, the risk of abusive i98os-style
transactions that could immediately render companies insolvent may be
low.' Consequently, future fraudulent conveyance cases may be more
likely to result from transactions that leave a company in a weakened
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2006. I am grateful to
Professor Frederick W. Lambert for his helpful comments, and to my family for their patience and
support.
i. See STANDARD & POOR'S, INC., Q4 2004 LEVERAGED Buyoutr REVIEW 14-I6 (2005). In addition,
loans made to finance LBOs increased more than four-fold from 2002 to 2004. Id. at I. As a result,
many financial advisory firms are hiring staff in anticipation of business failures resulting from an end
to the global credit boom. See Jennifer Hughes et al., Insolvency Advisors are Hiring More Staff, FIN.
TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 14, 2005, at I.
2. The total volume of institutional second lien loans increased from $65 million in 200I to $12.2
billion in 2004. STANDARD & POOR'S, INC., LEVERAGED COMMENTARY AND DATA (LCD) 24 (Mar. 3,
2005).

3. See Andrew R. Sorkin, Wall Street's Designs on 'o5? A Boom in Merger Activity, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2,2005, at I.
4. An example of a corporate reorganization raising fraudulent conveyance issues would be
when an operating subsidiary with a substantial amount of debt or contingent liabilities (such as
environmental or tort liabilities) transfers key assets such as intellectual property to an affiliate,
leaving fewer or less desirable assets behind to satisfy the liabilities.
5. See Hughes et al., supra note I, at 1 ("[T]he market is more aware of the risks than in previous
credit cycles.").
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financial state just short of insolvency-for example, a company that had
unreasonably small capital. These types of transactions may also raise
related issues, such as directors' fiduciary duties to creditors in the "zone
of insolvency," a rapidly growing and controversial area of law.
Unreasonably small capital, also referred to as unreasonably small
assets, is a financial condition that is an element of constructive fraud on
creditors addressed by the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(UFCA), Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) and Section 548 of
the Bankruptcy Code
Section 548). Since no statute defines
unreasonably small capital, the courts have been left to determine what
unreasonably small capital means and when a company is left with it.
While fraudulent conveyance laws have existed since the Roman
Empire,7 unreasonably small capital is an underdeveloped concept.
Prevailing case law, exemplified by Moody v. Security Pacific, defines
unreasonably small capital as a financial condition short of equitable
insolvency.' The general approach adopted by Moody and followed by
many courts to determine whether a company has unreasonably small
capital is a fact-based test of whether the company's cash flow forecasts
are reasonable and leave enough margin for error to account for
reasonably foreseeable difficulties." This could be described as a "cash
flow cushion" test."
This Note explores the purpose of the unreasonably small capital
element in fraudulent conveyance law and proposes that unreasonably
small capital be defined as a financial condition that poses an
unreasonable risk of loss to creditors.' 2 It proposes a broad-based test of
all facts and circumstances to determine when a company has
unreasonably small capital (unreasonable risk of loss to creditors),
including the amount of cash flow, equity cushion, 3 and other factors
that impact creditworthiness, including criteria used by ratings agencies
such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's. Part I describes fraudulent
6. See, e.g., Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co., Inc. (In re Healthco Int'l Inc.), 2o8 B.R. 288, 302
(Bankr. D. Mass. I997) (meaning of unreasonably small capital not defined in fraudulent transfer
statutes); Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.), 1o B.R. 127,
137 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (unreasonably small capital not defined in the UFCA or Section 548).
7. See infra note 23.
8. Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1o56, io64 (3d Cir. 1992).

9. Id. Equitable insolvency is often referred to as cash flow insolvency, a condition where a
company's cash flow is insufficient to pay its liabilities as they come due.
io. Id. at 1073.
i . See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying test.
12. See infra note 171 and accompanying text; Barry L. Zaretsky, FraudulentTransfer Law as the
Arbiter of UnreasonableRisk, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (1995). Professor Zaretsky suggested that
fraudulent transfer laws generally serve to prevent companies from taking unreasonable amounts of
risk, a purpose not originally contemplated when the fraudulent transfer laws were promulgated. Id.
13. Cash flow cushion refers to the excess of cash flow over the amount of cash required to pay
liabilities as they come due. Equity cushion refers to the amount by which assets exceed liabilities.
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conveyance law and unreasonably small capital, and traces its
development from inception during the Roman Empire through the
adoption of the UFCA, the first uniform national fraudulent conveyance
statute, enacted in 1918. Part II discusses existing case law on
unreasonably small capital. Finally, Part III suggests an alternative
approach to unreasonably small capital based on the proposition that
unreasonably small capital means unreasonable risk of loss. The
approach considers: the goals of fraudulent conveyance laws, judicial
precedent, and how creditors (including rating agencies) assess credit
risk.
I.
A.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE

LAW

INTRODUCTION

Modem fraudulent conveyance laws protect creditors by rendering
transfers of assets constructively fraudulent and voidable, without regard
to intent, when the transferor did not receive adequate consideration and
was, or was thereby rendered, insolvent or nearly insolvent.'4 They also
protect creditors from intentional fraud-transfers of assets made with
the intent to "hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor."'5
While early fraudulent conveyance cases and statutes focused on
intentional fraud, most attention in recent years has been paid to
constructive fraud. 6 Courts have determined that fraudulent conveyance
laws apply to leveraged buyouts and other transactions not intended to
defraud creditors.' 7 Fraudulent conveyance laws have existed since the

14. See generally UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT,7A U.L.A. 2 (1999); UNIF. FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER Act,7A U.L.A. 266 (1999); I1 U.S.C. § 548 (2ooo). "Insolvent" can mean balance sheet or

bankruptcy insolvency (assets do not exceed liabilities) or equitable insolvency (cash flow insufficient
to pay debts as they mature). See, e.g., Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, lO63-64 (3d
Cir. 1992); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co., Inc. (In re Healthco Int'l Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 301 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1997) ("Insolvency has a settled meaning under fraudulent transfer law, whether the relevant
statute be section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, the [UFTA] or the [UFCA]. Its statutory definition is,
in essence, an excess of liabilities over the value of assets. This is sometimes referred to as insolvency
in the bankruptcy sense."); MFS/Sun Life Trust v. Van Dusen Airport Servs. Co., 91o F. Supp. 913, 943
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (defining equitable insolvency as a condition where a debtor is unable to pay its debts
as they come due).
15. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(I), 7A U.L.A. 652-53, 657 (1985).

16. See, e.g., Zaretsky, supra note 12, at 1165-66.
17. See Moody, 971 F.2d at 1O64 ("We think it settled, as a general matter at least, that the
fraudulent conveyance provisions of the UFCA extend to [LBOs]."); MFS/Sun Life Trust, 910 F.
Supp. at 933 ("[C]ourts now uniformly hold that fraudulent conveyance laws apply to LBOs.").
[E]ven if the collusive aspects of the Elizabethan paradigm may not be present in an arm'slength LBO, creditors will suffer the same type of harm the laws were designed to remedy if
the target is rendered insolvent.... Thus, it matters little whether a creditor is unable to
recover because an individual debtor has secreted assets or because a corporate debtor has
been gutted by former owners who reap the proceeds of an LBO.
Id. But see Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 850 n.16 ( 9 th Cir. 1988) (UFCA's constructive fraud
provisions do not apply to LBOs that are publicly disclosed); Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Fed.
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Roman Empire, and while today they may be applied to more
sophisticated transactions than in the prior years, their purpose has
always been to protect creditors from fraudulent diminution of a debtor's
assets.' 8
Today, fraudulent conveyance laws are codified in the UFTA,
UFCA (the predecessor to the UFTA and still in effect in some
jurisdictions), and Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. While the
wording of these statutes differs, they each operate in a similar manner.
Courts will find constructive fraud when a debtor transferred an asset
without receiving reasonably equivalent value, and either before or after
the transfer, (a) assets did not exceed liabilities (the "balance sheet"
test), (b) the debtor was unable to pay its debts as they came due (the
"cash flow" test), or (c) the debtor was left with unreasonably small
capital for the9 business in which it is engaged (the "unreasonably small
capital" test).'
B.

UNREASONABLY SMALL CAPITAL TEST

Fraudulent conveyance laws would not be effective if they only
applied to debtors rendered insolvent by asset transfers. If so, a company
could transfer just enough assets to leave it barely solvent."0 For example,
Co., 629 F. Supp. i75, 179 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (questioning whether fraudulent conveyance laws apply to
LBOs). For criticism of the latter view, see Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund, 218 B.R. 656, 667-72
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1998) (criticizing Kupetz, Credit Managers and other Ninth Circuit decisions
questioning whether fraudulent conveyance laws apply to LBO's); id. at 672 ("[Tjhe Ninth Circuit
decisions on this subject are federal judicial legislation at its worst."); see also Orr v. Kinderhill Corp.,
991 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that a corporation's spin-off of real estate assets to shareholders
was a fraudulent conveyance).
18. See Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc. v. Spitters (In re Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc.),
174 B.R. 557, 571 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994) ("The purpose [of a fraudulent conveyance action] is to
prevent valuable assets from being transferred away from debtors in exchange for less than fair value,
leaving insufficient funds to compensate honest creditors."); Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group,
Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 777 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("[T]he law of fraudulent conveyance exists specifically to
protect creditors."); i GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 348 (rev. ed.
1940) (the "real test of a fraudulent conveyance... is the unjust diminution of the debtor's estate.");
Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223, 239 (1918)
[hereinafter Levinthal, The Early History] (discussing Roman fraudulent conveyance law) ("Any act
or forbearance by which a debtor diminished the amount of his property divisible among his creditors
was held to be in fraud of creditors.").
19. See, e.g., Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 343 (2d Cir. 2005) ("The Cash Flow test projects into
the future to determine whether capital will remain adequate over time...."); Mellon Bank, N.A. v.
Metro Commc'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 648 (3d Cir. i99i) (describing the balance sheet test under
Section 548); Peltz v. Hatten, 279 B.R. 710, 742-43 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002). Throughout this Note, I
refer to "unreasonably small capital," a term that appears in the UFCA and Bankruptcy Code.
Although the UFTA uses the words "unreasonably small assets," they have substantially the same
meaning. See Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.), ioo B.R.
127, 137 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) ("The [UFTA] substitutes assets for capital in order to avoid possible
confusion with the corporate law concept of capital, funds permanently invested in the business, which
has no relevance in fraudulent transfer law." (internal quotations omitted)).
20. See Moody, 971 F.2d at io7o n.22. The unreasonably small capital test only applies to debtors
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if a company's assets exceeded its liabilities by $i.oo, it would be deemed
balance sheet solvent and pass the balance sheet test. Alternatively, if a
company's projected future cash flow were just enough to pay its debts as
they came due and no more, it would be equitably solvent and pass the
cash flow test. In either case, the company's creditors would be exposed
to a high, and arguably unreasonable, degree of risk. Although some
companies left in this condition may prosper and pay its creditors, most
will be "doomed to failure." 2' Involuntary creditors of such companies
are unprotected against the slightest adverse development, foreseen or
unforeseen."
To prevent this type of harm to creditors, purposeful or not,
fraudulent conveyance laws prevent asset transfers that leave debtor
companies on the verge of insolvency. Although UFTA, UFCA and
Section 548 describe this condition using different words, the concept is
the same: unreasonably small capital means insufficient capital or assets
for the business in which the debtor is engaged. The problem in applying
the unreasonably small capital test is determining when capital, or assets,
become unreasonably small. Protection from transactions leaving
unreasonably small capital is closely related to other laws that protect
creditors from undercapitalization, such as statutory dividend
restrictions, alter ego liability (piercing the corporate veil) for initial
undercapitalization, and directors' fiduciary duties to creditors when a
corporation is in the "zone of insolvency."
C.

DEVELOPMENT OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE LAW AND THE
UNREASONABLY

SMALL CAPITAL TEST

i. Early History
Fraudulent conveyance laws, used to attack leveraged buyouts in the
i98os and beyond, have existed for over a thousand years, dating back to
the Roman Empire. 3 Roman fraudulent conveyance laws applied to acts
engaged in, or about to engage in, business. See, e.g., UNIT. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5, 7A U.L.A.
105 (1999) ("Conveyances by Persons in Business."). Therefore, in this Note, the word "company"
refers to a debtor engaged in business, regardless of the debtor's legal form.
21. See Daley v. Chang (In re Joy Recovery Tech. Corp.), 286 B.R. 54, 76 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002)
("Unreasonably small capital means ... the transaction in issue put [the debtor] on the road to ruin.");
Geron v. Schulman (In re Manshul Constr. Corp.), 97 Civ. 8851, 99 Civ. 2825, 200o U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12576, at *154 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2000) ("The [unreasonably small capital] test is aimed at
transfers that leave the transferor technically solvent but doomed to fail.").
22. See Moody, 971 F.2d at 1073 n.27.
23. See ORLANDO F. BUMP, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES: A TREATISE UPON CONVEYANCES MADE BY
DEBTORS To DEFRAUD CREDITORS 6 (3d ed. 1882) ("Roman Law is the oldest law upon the subject of

fraudulent conveyances, and embodies all the leading principles."); GLENN, supra note i8, at 82 ("In
Roman law.., fraudulent conveyance was fully recognized."); Levinthal, The Early History, supra
note I8, at 239 ("In Roman law.., elaborate provisions for vitiating fraudulent transfers of property
belonging to insolvent debtors were framed."). Translations of many Roman fraudulent conveyance
statutes may be found in Max Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law, 18 VA. L. REV. 109
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or forbearances "by which [an insolvent] debtor diminished the amount
of his property divisible among his creditors." 4 Such acts were deemed
fraudulent as to creditors and were rescindable.25 One of the more
general statements of Roman fraudulent conveyance law is found in the
Institutes of Justinian, 4, 6, 6:
[I]f any one has transferred his property to another in fraud of his
creditors, upon judgment to that effect by the chief provincial
magistrate, the creditors of the transferor may seize his property, avoid
the transfer, and recover the things transferred; this is, they may claim
that the things have not been transferred at all and accordingly are still
within the legal possession of the debtor. 6

Fraudulent debtors were subject to arrest, imprisonment, religious
sanctions and death. 7 Intent to defraud creditors was not always
required: at least one ancient case recognized constructive fraud.' s While
Roman fraudulent conveyance laws were meant to recover improperly
transferred property, so that it could be available for division among
creditors, Roman bankruptcy laws (the source of modern bankruptcy
law) were concerned with the sale of debtors' property and pro-rata
division of proceeds among creditors. 9
Roman fraudulent conveyance laws developed in tandem with other
debtor-creditor laws as commerce evolved. 0 In ancient times, credit was

virtually unheard of.3' As the notion of credit developed, so did the need
for collections. A creditor's original remedy was execution against the
person. 2 There were severe penalties for nonpayment.33 Execution
(0931).
24. See Levinthal, The Early History, supra note 18, at 239.

25. Id. ("If the transfer was without consideration, [it] was rescinded, even if the grantee were
wholly innocent. If the grantee had notice of the fraud, the transfer was rescinded, even if it were with
valuable consideration."). In addition, Roman law deemed all acts of a debtor within a thirty day
"suspicious period" prior to actual insolvency to be presumptively fraudulent. See GLENN, supra note
18, at 82-83. This is arguably the origin of the modern preference period contained in § 547 of the
Bankruptcy Code.
26. Radin, FraudulentConveyances at Roman Law, supra note 23, at 5O9 (quoting J. INST. 4.6.6).
27. See BUMP, supra note 23 at 4-5; Levinthal, The Early History, supra note i8, at 231, 238.
28. See Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law, supra note 23, at t22-23 ("Although it is
not alleged that he intended to defraud his creditors, nevertheless, when a man knows that he has
creditors and alienates all his property, it must be assumed that he intended to defraud them, and
therefore his sons are held liable even if they did not know that such was the intention of their father."
(translating and paraphrasing JULIAN's DIGEST bk. 49)).
29. See Levinthal, The Early History, supra note I8, at 235-37. The "Roman system of
bankruptcy ... is in fact the origin and fountain-head of all bankruptcy systems." Id. at 236.
30. See BUMP, supra note 23, at 1-7.
35. See BUMP, supra note 23, at i ("In the earliest stages of society .... [t]here are neither loans
nor debts, and commerce is unknown."); Levinthal, The Early History, supra note 18, at 228 ("In very
primitive society.., debtors and creditors are unknown .... ).
32. See Levinthal, The Early History, supra note i8, at 229-32.
33. See id. In primitive law, a creditor could seize a debtor and force him to work for him, sell him
and his relatives into slavery, "kill or maim [him], confine his wife, sons or cattle, or besiege him in his
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against property was typically limited only to the state. Over time,
creditors gained the right to proceed against a debtor's property as well
as the person.34 At first, there was a race of diligence where the creditors
who seized property first won.35 This free-for-all approach, similar to
modern state debt collections laws, evolved into a more orderly
bankruptcy system whereby the property of an insolvent debtor (subject,
in some cases, to exemptions), 6 was sold and the proceeds divided among
creditors, a process analogous to Chapter 7 bankruptcy.3 7 Roman law also
had an analog to Chapter 13 bankruptcy?8
In the Middle Ages, fraudulent conveyance laws found their way to
England.39 The English Parliament adopted a number of statutes,
beginning with 50 Edw. III, ch. 6 0376), to address the problem of
debtors seeking sanctuary to avoid paying creditors.4' This was a common

home." Id. at 230. In Rome, a creditor could kill a deadbeat debtor by the "laying on of hands, a mode
of execution which proceeded... with inexorable rigor." Id. at 231 (internal quotations omitted). If
there were multiple creditors, they could "cut the debtor's body into pieces." Id.
34. See id. at 232.
35. Id. at 235. The system of individual proprietary execution against property "made payment
the prize of a race of diligence and fostered fraud and collusion," making a system of bankruptcy a
"pressing necessity." Id.
36. Id. at 237 ("[In Islamic] law.., the honest but unfortunate debtor was allowed a definite
amount as an exemption.").
37. Levinthal, The Early History, supra note 18, at 235-37. Property was sold en bloc at auction,
or piecemeal by a "curator bonorum" appointed by the magistrate. Id. at 236. A "discharge" was only
available to honest (nonfraudulent) debtors. Id. at 238 ("[A] debtor whose insolvency was not due to
his own fault ... escaped liability to arrest and imprisonment.... Moreover.... he was allowed to
retain so much of his after[-]acquired property as was necessary for his subsistence."). Unlike modern
bankruptcy, the debtor continued to remain liable for the unpaid balance upon once again obtaining
wealth. Id. n.55.
38. Id. at 238 ("The debtor [could] apply to the emperor for an order requiring the creditors to
choose by a vote whether they would proceed at once to a surrender and sale of the estate, taking their
chances as to how far the available assets would go, or whether they would allow their debtor a period
not exceeding five years in which to pay.").
39. GLENN, supra note i8, at 83 & n.13. Roman law was first adopted in England following the
Roman conquest in 55 B.C. Hon. Arthur R. Emmett, Roman Traces in AustralianLaw, 20 AUSTL. BAR
REV. 1, 15 (2OOt). It disappeared from English law following the withdrawal of the Roman legions by
the fifth century A.D. Id. at 16. Roman law was reintroduced in England following the publication, in
the Ii9os, of a textbook written by a magister from Bologna, who had traveled to England at the
request of the Archbishop of Canterbury. Id.
40. See GLENN, supra note 18, at 83 n.13 & 84; see also Harkness v. P'ship Pac. Ltd. (1997) 23
A.C.S.R. i;Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. REV. I,
15-12 (1919) [hereinafter Levinthal, English Bankruptcy]. An earlier statute, 52 Hen. III, ch. 6, was
adopted in 1266 to annul "any conveyance made with intent to defeat a lord of his wardship." GLENN,
supra note 18, at 83 n.13.
Because [debtors] ...give their tenements and chattels to their friends, by collusion thereof
to have the profits at their will, and after do flee to... privileged places, and there do live a
great time with an high countenance of another man's goods and profits of said tenements
and chattels, until the said creditors shall be bound to take a small parcel of their debt, and
release the remnant,-It is ordained and asserted, that if it be found that such gifts be so
made by collusions, that the said creditors shall have execution of the said tenements and
chattels, as if no such gift had been made.
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practice where a debtor would transfer property to a friend or other
reliable third party and seek sanctuary in a church or other protected
place where creditors could not enter.4 ' The debtor would live there,
continuing to enjoy the income from the transferred property until
creditors agreed to accept a discounted settlement." Afterwards, the
transferee would reconvey the property back to the debtor, who would,
now debt-free, live happily ever after.43
In 1571, Parliament adopted the Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(commonly referred to as the Statute of Elizabeth).' The Statute of
Elizabeth, which restated existing common law and statutes' and
corresponded to Roman law,46 is viewed as the basis for modern
fraudulent conveyance law.47 It was intended to protect creditors.4
2.
Early Common Law Development of the Unreasonable
Capital Test
The Statute of Elizabeth migrated to the United States and was
universally adopted, with minor changes, by state legislatures.49 The
Statute of Elizabeth dealt solely with intentional fraud." Prior to the
adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in 1918,
constructive fraud and what was later known as the unreasonably small

Levinthal, English Bankruptcy, supra, at

11-12;

see also FREDERICK S. WAIT, A TREAnSE ON
(3d ed. 1897) (tracing the history of English

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND CREDITORS' BILLS 41-43

fraudulent conveyance statutes from 1376 to t570).
41. See GLENN, supra note 40, at 84. Anybody who attempted to enter a church to collect a debt
was subject to excommunication. Levinthal, English Bankruptcy, supra note 40, at so. Over time,
fraudulent conveyance statutes gave creditors greater rights to pursue debtors in sanctuaries. Id. at 1oi6.
42. See GLENN, supra note 18, at 84; Levinthal, English Bankruptcy, supra note 40, at 11-12.
43. See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Commc'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 645 (3d Cir. 1991); GLENN,
supra note i8, at 84.
44. See Mellon Bank, 945 F.2d at 644 (Statute of Elizabeth passed by Parliament in 157i); GLENN,
supra note is, at 43; HENRY W. MAY, A TREATISE ON THE STATUTES OF ELIZABETH AGAINST FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES 495-99 (1871). The Statute of Elizabeth remained in force in England until replaced in
1925. Max Radin, FraudulentConveyances in California and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
27 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1939) [hereinafter Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances in California].
45. See MAY, supra note 44, at 2, 6-8; Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances in California, supra note 44,
at 2.

46. See Harkness v. P'ship Pac. Ltd. (1997)

23

A.C.S.R. 1 (citing HENRY W. MAY, A TREATISE
6-8 (3d ed. 19o8)).

ON

THE STATUTES OF ELIZABETH AGAINST FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES

47. BumP, supra note 23, at so.

48. See id. at i.
49. See Peters v. Bain, 133 U.S. 67o, 685 (189o) ("The statute of Elizabeth, [ch.] 5, against
fraudulent conveyances has been universally adopted in American law as the basis of our
jurisprudence on that subject.., and reenacted in terms, or nearly so, or with some change of
language, by the legislatures of the several States." (internal citation omitted)).
50. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AcT PREFATORY NOTE, 9B U.L.A. 71 (1966) ("The Statute
of Elizabeth condemns conveyances as fraudulent only when made with the 'intent' to 'hinder, delay
or defraud."'). But see MAY, supra note 44, at 4 (noting that the Statute of Elizabeth was also directed
against constructive fraud).
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capital test developed in common law. 5
Carpenterv. Roe, decided in 1851, was one of the first known cases
to address unreasonably small capital." In Carpenter, defendant Roe, a
produce merchant, and his wife, transferred real property to their son-inlaw for no consideration.53 One week later, news arrived via steamer that
the price of grain had plunged, 4 and Roe became "utterly insolvent."55
His creditors brought a fraudulent conveyance action to set aside the
transfer. 56 The court voided the transfer, holding that even if Roe was not
insolvent at the time of the transfer, "[iut was sufficient that he was
indebted, and that insolvency would be the inevitable or probable result
of want of success in the business in which he was engaged." 7 The court
reasoned that Doe could not "in this manner provide for himself or his
family, and cast upon his creditors the hazard of his speculation." 5 The
court set forth a rule: "To invalidate a voluntary conveyance, as against
creditors, it is not necessary that the debtor be or believe himself
insolvent at the time of the grant; it is sufficient if his solvency is
contingent upon the stability of the market in the business in which he is
engaged."59 The risky nature of Roe's business was an important factor in
the court's decision, which noted that "poverty or riches [depended]
upon the intelligence to be brought by the next steamer." 6 Carpenter
stands for the proposition that an asset transfer, made without
consideration, should not be allowed to shift unfairly the risk of a
speculative business enterprise to creditors.
In 1873, twenty-two years after Carpenter, the Supreme Court
recognized unreasonably small capital as grounds for voiding an asset
transfer, even when a debtor was not insolvent. In Kehr v. Smith, the
Court considered whether a $7,000 marital settlement, paid by the
defendant to his estranged wife, constituted a fraudulent conveyance
when, after making the payment, his remaining assets were $176 less than
51. See infra notes 52-83 and accompanying text. The UFCA was the first known U.S. statute to
contain explicit constructive fraud and unreasonably small capital provisions.
52.

to N.Y. 227 (1851).

53. Id. at 228-29.
54- Id. at 229.
55. Id. at 231.
56. Id. at 229.
57. Id. at 232.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 227. Prior to the adoption of the UFCA, other courts followed Carpenter's concept of
unreasonably small capital. See, e.g., Brown v. Case, 69 P. 43, 46 (Or. 19o2) (a court may set aside a
voluntary transfer made without receiving adequate consideration when the debtor's solvency "was
contingent upon the stability of the market in the business in which he was engaged."); Hagerman v.
Buchanan, 17 A. 946, 948 (N.J. 1889) (engaging in a hazardous or speculative business is presumptively
fraudulent if done at the same time or shortly after a voluntary asset transfer).
6o. Carpenter,so N.Y. at 231.
61. Kehr v. Smith, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 31 (1873).
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his debts."z In finding that it was, the Court noted that even if the
defendant's estate were worth "a few thousand dollars more," the
settlement would still be fraudulent because the extent of the debt "for a
person in his situation" would "have a direct tendency to impair the
rights of creditors." 63 The Court held that "the rule generally adopted in
this country at the present time, will uphold [the marriage settlement] if
it be reasonable, not disproportionate to the husband's means, taking
into view his debts and situation, and clear of any intent.., to defraud
creditors." '6 In other words, if an asset transfer not meant to defraud
creditors results in positive but small remaining net assets, 65 the transfer
could be constructively fraudulent depending on the facts and
circumstances. As in Carpenter, the Court was concerned with risk
shifting, but focused on the small amount of remaining net assets (equity
cushion), not whether the debtor was engaged in a risky business. 67 An
earlier Massachusetts case reached a similar conclusion.68
A later case articulated a facts and circumstances-based test for
unreasonably small capital that considered both the amount of remaining
assets (capital) and riskiness of the debtor's business. 6' In Hagerman v.
Buchanan, the plaintiff sought to void the defendant's transfer of a house
to his wife7' on the same day he entered into a business partnership.7' The
partnership became insolvent three or four months later." The court
noted that "[entering] into a hazardous business ... or [engaging] in a
speculative enterprise, at or soon after the execution of a voluntary
conveyance, is strong evidence of a fraudulent intent. It evinces a desire
to reap the benefit for himself if successful, and escape responsibility if
62. Id. at 31-32.
63. Id. at 35.
64. Id.

65. Net assets mean assets minus liabilities.
66. The Court noted that the unreliability of asset appraisals was one reason why small remaining
net assets (equity) posed a high risk to creditors. Kehr, 87 U.S. at 35. ("Meyer was not only largely
indebted for a person in his situation, but it is easy to see it would have been close work for his
creditors to have made their debts, if they had tried to enforce their collection by judicial process, a
surer way of ascertaining the real worth of the property than by the opinions of indifferent persons, as
experience has proved that this kind of testimony is often unreliable .... "). It is not clear whether the
Court is suggesting that asset values are inherently volatile and unpredictable, or that expert witness
testimony is suspect (or both).
67. Id.

68. Winchester v. Charter, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 6o6, 6o9 (1866) ("[A] voluntary transfer of
property by a person deeply indebted, and whose property was... barely sufficient for the payment of
his debts, would furnish strong presumptive evidence of fraud.").
69. Hagerman v. Buchanan, 17 A. 946, 948 (N.J. 1889). The drafters of the UFCA referred
specifically to Hagerman in a footnote to section 5. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 5 n.1
(19t8), reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE
OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 353 (I918).
o

7 . Hagerman, 17 A. at 946.

71. Id. at 948.
72. Id.
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unlucky."73 Nonetheless, the court did not adopt a per se rule,74 and
instead adopted a test that considered the "character of the business, the
degree of pecuniary hazard incurred, the amount of property remaining
in the grantor, the value of the property conveyed, [and] the acts and
words occurring coincidently with the transaction" to determine whether
fraudulent intent should be inferred. 5 Put differently, if unreasonably
small capital remaining in the transferor is grounds for a fraudulent
conveyance, then the hazardous nature of the business should be
considered. The court did not void the asset transfer, finding that the
defendant did his due diligence and "tried to be careful not to involve
himself in a precarious business. ' 6
In addition to unreasonably small capital, courts recognized the
difference between balance sheet and equity (cash flow) insolvency. In
Potterv. McDowell, the Missouri Supreme Court said:
If a debtor is in embarrassed circumstances, and makes a voluntary
conveyance, and is afterwards unable to meet his debts owing at the
time of the assignment in the ordinary course prescribed by law for
their collection, or is reduced to that situation that an execution against
him would be unavailing, such conveyance is void as to those debts,
and the property conveyed is subject to their payment.77
The Potter court rejected defining insolvency solely in terms of equity
insolvency." In fact, it found it unnecessary to define insolvency at all,
and felt that the real issue was identifying what constituted evidence of
insolvency.79 The court appeared to acknowledge the concept of
unreasonably small capital when it said "we do not consider that in order
to make [a transfer fraudulent as to existing creditors] that the defendant
73. Id. The court's language could similarly be used to describe the nature of a leveraged buyout.
74- Id. ("[E]ach case must stand on its own footing, and no legal rule can be adopted as to the
quantity of proof, or the particular complexity of facts, which will annul a conveyance .... ").
75. Id.; see also UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 5 ndI (1918), reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL

MEETING OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS

353 (1918) ("[Fraudulent] 'intent' can be presumed from the nature of the business.").
76. Hagerman, 17 A. at 948 ("Mr. Hagerman inquired, as he says he did, particularly about the
[partnership's] business .... ").
77. Potter v. McDowell, 31 Mo. 62, 72-73 (186o) ("Unable to meet his debts owing at the time of
the assignment in the ordinary course prescribed .. . for their collection" appears to refer to equity
(cash flow) insolvency, and "an execution against him would be unavailing" appears to refer to
balance sheet insolvency (assets less than liabilities)).
78. Id. at 73 ("We do not adopt the meaning of [insolvency] given it by the English courts in
construing the bankrupt laws. There it is said that a man is in insolvent circumstances when he is not in
a condition to pay his debts in the ordinary course, as persons carrying on in trade usually do."
(internal quotations and citations omitted)).
79. Id. ("We do not deem it necessary to define insolvency. We all know what actual insolvency
is, but we may differ as to what is the evidence of insolvency."). Although the court deemed it
unnecessary to define insolvency, it commented that a better definition than equity insolvency was "if
all a man's debts can not be collected by legal process out of his own means." Id. The court appears to
be embracing a flexible and common sense view of insolvency-e.g., a debtor is insolvent if creditors
do not get paid in full.
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should have been insolvent at the time of making them.""'
The concept of unreasonably small capital- developed in Kehr,
Potter and other early cases that focused on the adequacy of equity
cushion, but not business risk-is illustrated in Rose v. Dunklee."I There,
the court considered whether a transfer of property from mother to
daughter, in consideration of a "very ancient claim" arising from an
inheritance, should be voided as fraudulent to creditors.82 The court
described the law as follows:
Wherever the amount of property so closely approximates the amount
of the liabilities that the conveyance would have a direct tendency to
impair the rights of creditors if they should attempt to force collection
by judicial process, the debtor is adjudged insolvent.... The property
which must remain to the debtor after such a transfer must be, as some
of the cases put it, clearly and amply sufficient to satisfy his debts; and
it is enough in such a case to show that the grantor was embarrassed,
and in doubtful circumstances,
and his solvency or insolvency may be
83
judged by what happens.
Rose holds that remaining capital is inadequate when it is not
"clearly and amply sufficient" to satisfy debts. Carpenterand Hagerman
suggest that business risk should be a factor when determining whether
remaining capital is clearly and amply sufficient. And Potter suggests that
the test of whether remaining capital is clearly and amply sufficient could
be prospective balance sheet or equity (cash flow) insolvency. Taken
together, these early cases represent a simple framework for analyzing
whether a transaction leaves a debtor with unreasonably small capital: an
asset transfer is voidable, in the absence of balance sheet or equity
insolvency, if it shifts a sufficiently large amount of risk-measured in
terms of the underlying business risk, remaining equity cushion, and
remaining cash flow cushion-to creditors. Despite the passage of many
years, these concepts appear in many contemporary cases involving
leveraged buyouts decided under the UFCA, UFTA and Section 548.
3. Uniform FraudulentConveyance Act
In 1918, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (the Conference) adopted the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act (UFCA).84 The UFCA's goal was to end confusion and
uncertainty in then-existing fraudulent conveyance law by defining
insolvency, clarifying those persons who have standing, and codifying
constructive fraud. 8' The UFCA did not break new legal ground as it
8o. Id.
81. 56 P. 342 (Colo. 1899).
82. Id. at 342-43.
83. Id. at 345.
84. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE
COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS

TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL

MEETING OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF

348 (1918) (resolution of Aug. 24, 1918 approving the UFCA).

85. Id. at 349; see also id. at 349-50 ("Need for definite statutory statement does not arise so much
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merely restated existing common law. The unreasonably small capital
provision is contained in Section 5:
Section 5. [Conveyances by Persons in Business.]
Every conveyance made without fair consideration when the person
making it is engaged or is about to engage in a business or transaction
for which the property remaining in his hands after the conveyance is
an unreasonably small capital, is fraudulent as to creditors and as to
other persons who become creditors during the continuance of such
business of transaction without regard to his actual intent.7
The UFCA does not define unreasonably small capital.m The
intended meaning of the phrase appears to be taken from the Carpenter
and Hagerman line of cases dealing with hazardous or risky businesses,
as is evident from the first draft of Section 5:
Sec. 5. [Conveyances by Persons in Hazardous Business.]

Every conveyance made voluntarily and without a fair consideration,
when the person making it is engaged or is about to engage in a
hazardous business or transaction involving risks exceeding his
remaining assets, is fraudulent as to present creditors and other
persons who become creditors as the result of existing but unmatured
obligations, or as the result of obligations entered into
9 or acts done
during the continuation of such business or transaction.
While the language in the draft is not controlling, it adds insight to
the drafters' intended meaning of unreasonably small capital. The draft
mentions "risks exceeding.., remaining assets" instead of liabilities
exceeding remaining assets.' The drafters seem to have focused on
business risks that might cause future insolvency. The substitution of
"unreasonably small capital" for "remaining assets" implies that
"unreasonably small capital" likely means something very similar to
"unreasonably small remaining assets."'"
from actual conflict between the law of different jurisdictions growing out of clear cut differences in
judicial decisions, as from confusion of thought manifested in judicial opinions, which renders the law
in a great degree uncertain in all jurisdictions.... The Chief benefit to be derived from the adoption of
the [UFCA] is that.., it will give a known certainty to the law which it does not now possess."); UNIF.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT PREFATORY NOTE, 7A U.L.A. 268 (I999).
86. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT PREFATORY NOTE (I918), reprinted in Annual
Meeting Proceedings, 28 NAT'L CONF. COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. LAWS 349 0918) ("The Act as
drafted makes few changes in the law of any state.").
87. Annual Meeting Proceedings, 28 NAT'L CONF. COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. LAWS 353

(1918)) (resolution of Aug. 24, I918 approving the UFCA) (footnote omitted).
88. Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.), too B.R. 127, 137
(Bankr. D. Mass. i989).
89. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 5 (First Tentative Draft 1916), reprinted in Annual
Meeting Proceedings, 26 NAT'L CONF. COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. LAWS 256 (i916) (footnote
omitted).
o
9 . Id. (emphasis added).
91. The UFTA, adopted in 1984, substituted "unreasonably small assets" for "unreasonably small
capital." See infra note lo8 and accompanying text.
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Twenty-four states and the U.S. Virgin Islands adopted the UFCA.9"
It remains in effect today in New York, Maryland, Wyoming and the
U.S. Virgin Islands. 3 Many of the leading cases concerning unreasonably
small capital were based on the UFCA.
4. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code
The first federal law on fraudulent conveyances was included in
section 67(e) of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. 94 The statute's wording was
very similar to the Statute of Elizabeth,95 but only dealt with actual fraud,
not constructive fraud. 6 In 1938, the Chandler Act replaced the 1898
Bankruptcy Act. 97 Its fraudulent conveyance provisions, contained in
section 67 (d), recognized constructive fraud. 98 The Bankruptcy Code's
current fraudulent conveyance provisions are contained in Section 548,
which replaced section 67(d) of the Act.'
Section 548, derived from the Statute of Elizabeth,'" contains
fraudulent conveyance provisions similar to the UFCA.'I ' It was meant to
mirror the fraudulent conveyance provisions of the UFCA. °2 Section
548(a)(I) reads:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or

incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing of the
petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily-

(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor

was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(B) (i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and (ii)
(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result
of such transfer or obligation;
(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to
engage in business or a transaction, for which any property
remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital;
7 A U.L.A. 268 (I999).
93. See 7A U.L.A. I (Supp. 2004) (table of jurisdictions where the UFCA remains in effect).
94. E.g., Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc. v. Spitters (In re Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc.),
174 B.R. 557, 572 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994).
95. Id.
96. E.g., Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Co. (In re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1984).
97. PajaroDunes, 174 B.R. at 572.
98. Id.
99. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1298 (3d Cir. 1986).
Ioo. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Commc'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635,644 (3d Cir. 1991).
IoI. See Tabor CourtRealty, 803 F.2d at 1298-99.
io2. Id. at 1299.

92. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT PREFATORY NOTE,
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or
(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would
incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay
as such debts matured."'
Like the UFCA, Section 548 does not define unreasonably small
capital.I"4
5. Uniform FraudulentTransfer Act
The Conference adopted the UFTA in 1984 as a replacement for the
UFCA. It preserved the UFCA's basic structure and approach, 5 but
made a number of changes to better correspond to Section 548 and to
correct a number of the UFCA's perceived shortcomings. ' 6 It changed
the name of the act from UFCA to UFTA in recognition of the UFTA's
applicability to transfers of personal, as well as real property."
The Conference made two important changes to the UFCA's
constructive fraud and unreasonably small capital provisions.
"Unreasonably small capital" was relabeled "unreasonably small assets"
to clarify that "capital" does not have the same meaning in fraudulent
conveyance law that it does in corporate law.' ° Under the UFTA,
"assets" exclude property to the extent encumbered by valid liens or to
the extent exempted under non-bankruptcy law." 9 Section 4(a) of the
UFTA reads:
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer
was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the
transfer or incurred the obligation:
(i) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of
the debtor; or
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a
transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction;
or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have
believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or
103. II U.S.C. §548(a)(I) (2000).
104. See Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc. v. Spitters (In re Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc.),
174 B.R. 557, 591 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994).
105. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT PREFATORY NOTE, 7A U.L.A. 269 (1999).

io6. Id.at 268.
1o7. Id. at 269.
O8. Id. at 302-03 ("The reference to 'capital' in the [UFCA] is ambiguous in that it may refer to
net worth or to the par value of stock or to the consideration received for stock issued. The special
meanings of 'capital' in corporation law have no relevance in the law of fraudulent transfers.").
io9. Id. at 275, 276.
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her] ability to pay as they became due."'

II.
A.

UNREASONABLY SMALL CAPITAL IN MODERN LAW

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE LAW

Modern fraudulent conveyance statutes consist of the UFCA and
UFTA, as enacted under state law, and Section 548." While each have
unreasonably small capital tests, not a single one provides a definition. In
interpreting the statutes, courts have dealt with two fundamental issues.
First, courts have had to determine the meaning of unreasonably small
capital. Second, they have had to determine when a debtor is left with
unreasonably small capital." 2
Moody v. Security Pacific Business Credit, decided in 1992, is one of
the leading cases on unreasonably small capital."3 In Moody, the court
evaluated whether the failed leveraged buyout of Jeanette Corp., a
manufacturer of glassware and other household products, was a
fraudulent conveyance under Pennsylvania's version of the UFCA."4
One of the main issues on appeal was whether the leveraged buyout
rendered the company insolvent or left it with unreasonably small
capital."5 The court made two important findings regarding unreasonably
small capital, providing both a definition and a test to determine when a
debtor has unreasonably small capital. Moody has been widely followed
by other courts. " 6
First, Moody held that unreasonably small capital is a "financial
condition short of equitable insolvency."'" 7 The court noted that in a
business setting, "capital is a term of art" and refers to "accumulated

iio. Id. at 301.

i i i. Four states - Alaska, Mississippi, South Carolina and Virginia - have not enacted either the
UFCA or UFTA. See 7A U.L.A. I, 26 (Supp. 2004) (tables of jurisdictions where the UFCA and
UFFA are in effect). In Virginia, recovery of property is limited to cases of actual fraud, not
constructive fraud. In re Best Prods. Co., 168 B.R. 35, 52 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
I12. Small capital or assets (undercapitalization) is a common sense notion. The difficult question
is determining when small capital or assets becomes unreasonably small.
113. 971 F.2d io56, 1070 (3d Cir. 1992).
ii4. Id. at 1059, io63. The District Court found it unnecessary to separately consider whether the
transaction constituted a fraudulent conveyance under Section 548 because its fraudulent conveyance
provisions "are modeled after and typically interpreted in conjunction with those of the UFCA" and
"it follows that if the leveraged buyout is not fraudulent under the UFCA, it is not fraudulent under
§ 548 of the Bankruptcy Code." Id.at io62 n.5. Pennsylvania replaced the UFCA with the UFTA in
1993. See 7A U.L.A. 26 (Supp. 2004) (table of jurisdictions that have adopted the UFTA).
i15. Moody, 97I F.2d at io62, io65. The court noted, without debate, that the UFCA applied to
leveraged buyouts. Id. at 1058 (The "Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA)
extends to leveraged buyouts.").
i6. See infra note 139.
117. Moody, 971 F.2d at i7o. Equitable insolvency, sometimes referred to as cash flow insolvency,

is a financial condition where a company is unable to pay its debts as they come due. See Queenan,
infra note i19, at 13.
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goods, possessions, and assets, used for the production of profits and
wealth.".... Therefore, the court reasoned, unreasonably small capital
refers to an "inability to generate sufficient profits to sustain operations,"
and "[b]ecause an inability to generate enough cash flow to sustain
operations must precede an inability to pay obligations as they become
due, unreasonably small capital would seem to encompass financial
difficulties short of equitable insolvency..'".9 In short, the court held that
unreasonably small capital means just barely equitably (cash flow)
solvent. The court rejected another leading view of unreasonably small
capital, which per se equates a finding of equitable insolvency with that
of unreasonably small capital.2
An important unanswered question in Moody is why the court
viewed unreasonably small capital as a financial condition short of
equitable insolvency instead of either equitable or balance sheet
insolvency. Earlier cases written by Judge Queenan and cited in Moody
followed the broader view.'2' The Moody court's argument is similar to
Judge Queenan's 1989 article (concluding that unreasonably small capital
118. Moody, 971 F.2d at Io7o (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 189
(5th ed. 1979) ) .
I19. Id. Contra James F. Queenan, Jr., The Collapsed Leveraged Buyout and the Trustee in
Bankruptcy, II CARDOZo L. REV. 1, 18 (1989) ("Unreasonably small capitalization encompasses
financial difficulties which are short of equitable or bankruptcy insolvency ....). Bankruptcy
insolvency, sometimes referred to as balance sheet insolvency, is a financial condition where assets (at
a fair valuation) are less than liabilities. See Stillwater Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Kirtley (In re
Solomon), 299 B.R. 626, 638 (B.A.P.ioth Cir. 2003).
120. Moody, 971 F.2d at Io7o. The court noted that if the drafters of the UFCA had viewed
equitable insolvency and unreasonably small capital interchangeably, it would have expected them to
use the same language in sections 4 and 5.Id. The view that a finding of equitable insolvency means
unreasonably small capital per se has deep historical roots. See, e.g., Rose v. Dunklee, 56 P. 342, 345
(Colo. 1899) ("The property which must remain to the debtor after such a transfer must be... clearly
and amply sufficient to satisfy his debts.., and his solvency or insolvency may be judged by what
happens."). The per se rule was criticized in Bruce A. Markell, Toward True and Plain Dealing:A
Theory of Fraudulent Transfers Involving UnreasonablySmall Capital, 21 IND. L. REV. 469, 492-95
(1988). In preparing this Note, I did not identify any reported cases in the past ten years that relied on
the per se theory.
121. See Murphy v. Meritor Say. Bank (In re O'Day Corp.), 126 B.R. 370, 407 (Bankr. D. Mass.
I99I) (Queenan, J.) ("[U]nreasonably small capitalization encompasses financial difficulties which are
short of equitable insolvency or bankruptcy insolvency ..." (quoting Queenan, supra note Ir9, at 18)
(internal quotations omitted)); Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply,
Inc.), Ioo B.R. 127, 137 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (Queenan, J.) ("Unreasonably small capital ...
encompasses difficulties which are short of insolvency in any sense...." (emphasis added)); Moody,
971 F.2d at 1O7O n.2o (quoting Murphy and Vadnais Lumber Supply in support of Moody's statement
that "others have said that unreasonably small capital encompasses financial difficulties short of
equitable insolvency," id. at lO7O). Despite the court's reliance on Murphy and Vadnais Lumber
Supply, these cases do not appear to support this statement. Further, Judge Queenan's opinion in
Murphy (quoted in Moody) misquoted his earlier article. Compare Murphy, 126 B.R. at 407
("financial difficulties ...short of equitable insolvency or bankruptcy insolvency"), with Queenan,
supra note t 19, at 18 ("financial difficulties ... short of equitable or bankruptcy insolvency"). It is not
clear whether this minor error in Murphy influenced Moody's oft-repeated holding that "unreasonably
small capital denotes a financial condition short of equitable insolvency." Moody, 971 F.2d at 1070.
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is a financial condition short of equitable or balance sheet insolvency),'"
but comes to a different conclusion.'23 Later cases have largely followed
Moody's cash flow-based definition of unreasonably small capital.' 4
Judge Queenan, however, expanded his earlier analysis applied in
O'Day and equated unreasonably small capital with the risk, not
likelihood, of insolvency. In Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co., the court
considered whether directors should be held liable for breach of fiduciary
duty by approving an LBO that left the debtor insolvent or with
unreasonably small capital.' 5 In Judge Queenan's decision, the court
equated unreasonably small capital with an unreasonable risk of
insolvency. 1"6 It compared unreasonable risk of insolvency with
negligence, "which is conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of harm"

to others. 7
Second, Moody held that the test for unreasonably small capital is
"reasonable foreseeability" and the critical issue is whether the financial
projections prepared by the parties to the LBO were reasonable."28 The
reasonableness of cash flow projections test originated in Credit
Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co.'29 In Credit Managers, the court began its
unreasonably small capital analysis by noting that the outcome should
consider the facts and circumstances on a case-by-case basis, an
expansive view embraced by other courts.'30 In determining that the

122. Compare Moody, 971 F.2d at 1070, with Queenan, supra note I 19, at 17-18.
123. Compare Moody, 971 F.2d at lO7O (equitable insolvency), with Queenan, supra note i 19, at 18
(equitable or balance sheet insolvency).
124. See, e.g., Ring v. Bergman (In re Bergman), 293 B.R. 580, 584 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2003); Peltz
v. Hatten, 279 B.R. 710, 744-45 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002); Geron v. Schulman (In re Manshul Constr.
Corp.), 97 Civ. 8851, 99 Civ. 2825, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12576, at *154 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30,
2000); MFS/Sun Life Trust v. Van Dusen Airport Servs. Co., 91o F. Supp. 913,944 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); In
re Best Prods. Co., I68 B.R. 35, 54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (The focus on the reasonableness of
projections used to justify a transaction is a "trend.").
125. Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 293, 301 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1997). The case was based on a theory of director liability in the zone of insolvency rather than
fraudulent conveyance. Id. at 301. The court utilized the definition of unreasonably small capital under
fraudulent conveyance law. Id. at 302.
126. Id. ("[Unreasonably small capital] connotes a condition of financial debility short of
insolvency (in either the bankruptcy or equity sense) but which makes insolvency reasonably
foreseeable. In other words, a transaction leaves a company with unreasonably small capital when it
creates an unreasonable risk of insolvency, not necessarily a likelihood of insolvency.").
127.

Id.

128. Moody, 971 F.2d at 1073 ("The critical question is whether the parties' projections were
reasonable."). The reasonableness test is presumably applied to projections showing that the company
is equitably solvent (e.g., able to pay its debts as they mature). See id. at 1071 ("[D]efendants' decision
to enter into the [transaction] challenged here was predicated on their projections that the acquisition
would succeed .... " (emphasis added)).
129. Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Fed. Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 182 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
130. Id. at 183 ("Whether [debtor] was undercapitalized.., is a 'question of fact that must be
ascertained on a case by case basis."' (quoting Wells Fargo Bank v. Desert View Bldg. Supplies, Inc.
(In re Desert View Bldg. Supplies, Inc.), 475 F. Supp. 693, 697 (D. Nev. 1978), affd 633 F.2d 225 (9th
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reasonableness of the cash flow projections in this case was probative of
unreasonably small capital, the court relied heavily on the expert
testimony of a regional manager of General Electric Credit Corp.
(GECC).'3 ' The witness testified that "projected cash flow.., is among
the most important factors [GECC] consider[s,]" while assets are less
important.'32 The court reasoned that the pertinent question was whether
"GECC's projection... was reasonable and prudent at the time it was
made," and found that it was.'33

In determining whether the forecasts were reasonable, the Moody
court held that they "must be tested by an objective standard anchored in
the company's actual performance" (e.g., whether they were consistent
with the company's prior financial performance).'34 In Pajaro Dunes, the
court evaluated "reasonable" in terms of whether the information used
by the parties to prepare the forecasts were "flawed and overly optimistic
from the beginning."' ' In addition to consistency with historical results,
the forecasts must "incorporate some margin for error.' ' I 6 This forwardlooking approach can be viewed as a cash flow cushion test.'37 In order to
have enough cushion, the forecasts should allow for reasonably
foreseeable difficulties that could arise.' 35 Later cases have widely
followed Moody and Credit Managers' cash flow reasonableness test.'39
Cir. I98o))); see also Yoder v. T.E.L. Leasing, Inc. (In re Suburban Motor Freight, Inc.), 124 B.R. 984,
998 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 199o) (the meaning of unreasonably small capital "must... be ascertained
upon a case-by-case review of the capital structure of a debtor's business.").
13I. Credit Managers, 629 F. Supp. at 183 ("The testimony of GECC's [regional manager] is
especially probative" in concluding that the debtor "was not undercapitalized at the time of the
buyout.").
132. Id.
133. Id. at 184.
134. Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, 971 F.2d 1056, 1073 (3d Cir. 1992). Relevant historical data
include cash flow, net sales, gross profit margin and net profits and losses. Id. In addition, the
projections must consider reasonably foreseeable difficulties that might arise, including "interest rate
fluctuations and general economic downturns," and "otherwise incorporate some margin for error."
Id.
135. Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc. v. Spitters (In re Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc.), 174
B.R. 557, 593 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994).
136. Moody, 971 F.2d at 1073. Examples of difficulties that are likely to arise include "interest rate
fluctuations and general economic downturns." Id.
137. The Moody court evaluated capital sufficiency in terms of whether the financial projections
were reasonable. One of the principal concerns was whether there was enough margin for error in the
projections. Since financial projections by themselves cannot determine whether a company is solvent,
the court was really asking whether the financial projections used in the LBO showed there was
sufficient cash flow to pay the company's debts as they came due, were reasonably prepared and
credible, and contained sufficient margin for error. In essence, the Moody test boils down to whether a
company has enough "cushion" in its financial (cash flow) projections to withstand reasonably
foreseeable events and still pay its debts as they come due.
138. See supra note 134. Conceptually, the Moody approach is consistent with the intentions of the
UFCA's drafters and the common law that the remaining capital should be proportionate to the risky
or hazardous nature of the particular business. See supra notes 52-90 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Ring v. Bergman (In re Bergman), 293 B.R. 580, 584 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2003); Peltz
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In applying the reasonableness test, a number of issues arise,
including the amount of time over which to analyze projected cash flows
and whether it is appropriate to consider debt financing, equity financing,
or asset sales as sources of cash. Generally, courts have held that
companies do not have unreasonably small capital if they survive for an

"extended period" of time-up to one year.'4 A business can fail for
many other reasons beside inadequate capital, and presumably the
longer the time period before failure, the greater the chance the business
failed for other reasons, making causation more difficult to establish. A
recent case upheld a three-year period as appropriate for cash flow
analysis, based on the nature of the debtor's business (a holding
company).'4 It does make sense to fix a time period over which to draw
conclusions. However, the time period ought to be sufficient to
determine whether the alleged undercapitalization caused the company
to default on its obligations.'42
"Cash flow" generally consists of cash from operations,'43 plus
proceeds from debt financing, equity financing and asset sales. Courts
have considered each of these sources of cash in analyzing unreasonably
small capital. They are divided on whether future borrowing, from
established lines of credit or otherwise, should count.'" Although
additional equity financing may be a speculative and unreliable source of
cash, at least one court allowed it.'4 In Peltz v. Hatten, the court found

v. Hatten, 279 B.R. 71o, 744-45 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002); WRT Creditors Liquidation Trust v. WRT
Bankr. Litig. Master File Defendants (In re WRT Energy Corp.), 282 B.R. 343, 411 (Bankr. W.D. La.
2001); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 195 B.R. 971, 981 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1996) ("[U]nreasonably small capital typically depends upon the reasonableness of the parties'
projections."). But see Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co., Inc. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 202 B.R. 288, 302
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (unreasonably small capital connotes a financial debility short of equity or
bankruptcy insolvency).
140. See Daley v. Chang (In re Joy Recovery Tech. Corp.), 286 B.R. 54, 76 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 2002)
(noting other cases where courts did not find unreasonably small capital when creditors were paid
eight to twelve months after asset transfers). But see infra note 141 and accompanying text (three-year
time horizon appropriate).
141. Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449, 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[A] three-year horizon is
appropriate for evaluation of the cash flow and capital adequacy of a holding company such as [the
debtor].").
142. See Markell, supra note 120, at 504-05 (discussing the need for a direct and causal link
between an asset transfer and non-payment of creditors).
143. Cash flow from operations could include profits or losses. Proceeds from debt financing,
equity financing and asset sales could, in theory, supplement low cash flow or make up for negative
cash flow.
144. Compare Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1072-73 (3d Cir. 1992)
(borrowing is a factor in testing for unreasonably small capital), and VFB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co.,
No. 02-137, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19999, at *ro6 (D. Del. Sept. 13, 2oo5) ("When considering if a
business is inadequately capitalized, it is proper to consider the availability of credit."), with Murphy v.
Mentor Say. Bank (In re O'Day Corp.), 126 B.R. 370,408 (Bankr. D. Mass. 199i) (rejecting borrowing
as a source of cash flow for unreasonably small capital test).
145. Peltz v. Hatten, 279 B.R. 710,745 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
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that a formerly high flying but money-losing telecommunications
company, USN Communications, did not have unreasonably small
capital because, in part, the company had the ability to raise considerable
additional debt and equity capital. 6 When combined with considerable
cash-on-hand, there would have been sufficient financial resources to
fund its high-growth, cash-consuming business strategy.'47 The court
noted that if the company perceived it would not have access to
additional capital, it could scale back its operations.' Asset sales are
another source of cash accepted by courts.'49 Key issues are whether the
assets to be sold are "core assets" critical to the cash-flow generating
capabilities of the rest of the business, 5 ' the feasibility of sales, timing
and valuation. Some courts and commentators have advocated a broad
definition of cash flow, to include cash from all sources.''
Although the Moody framework appears to be the majority view on
unreasonably small capital, other approaches have been followed. Some
courts have looked at financial ratios, historic need for working capital,
and industry comparisons. 5 ' Some have looked at other factors and
tests.'53 In every case, the goal is the same: courts want to identify those
146. Id. at 745-47.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 747. The company filed for bankruptcy after the capital markets unexpectedly dried up
and the company failed to scale back its operations until after it was too late. Id. at 747-48. Arguably,
both events (collapse in the availability of financing for money-losing technology companies and
management mistakes grounded in over optimism) were reasonably foreseeable. Although the court
did not find the debtor to have unreasonably small capital, this case highlights the need to be cautious
about relying on debt or equity financing as a source of cash to pay creditors.
149. See Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.), ioo B.R. 527,
137 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) ("The courts have applied the fraudulent transfer concept by looking to
the ability of the debtor to generate enough cash from operations or asset sales to pay its debts and
still sustain itself."); Salisbury v. Tex. Commerce Bank, N.A. (In re WCC Holding Corp.), 171 B.R.
972, 985 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994) ("Unreasonably small assets signifies an inability to generate enough
cash flow from operations and the sale of assets to remain financially stable.").
i5o. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. First State Bank of Benson, 48 B.R. 497, 501 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985)
(unreasonably small capital depends on whether transferred property was "necessary to the continued
operation of the.., business."); STANDARD & POOR'S, INC., 2005 CORPORATE RATINGS CRITERIA 32

(2005) ("As going concerns, companies should not be expected to repay debt by liquidating
operations.").
151. See Markell, supra note 120, at 496.
152. See Daley v. Chang (In re Joy Recovery Tech. Corp.), 286 B.R. 54,76 (Bankr. N.D. InI. 2002);

Geron v. Schulman (In re Manshul Constr. Corp.), 97 Civ. 8851, 99 Civ. 2825, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12576, at *154 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2000); MFS/Sun Life Trust v. Van Dusen Airport Servs. Co.,
9I0 F. Supp. 913,944 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
153. See, e.g., Diller v. Irving Trust Co., 62 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1933) (encumbering all assets is
unreasonably small capital per se); Yoder v. T.E.L. Leasing, Inc. (In re Suburban Motor Freight, Inc.),
124 B.R. 984, 999 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 199o) (weigh financial data against nature of the entity and its
need for capital); Wells Fargo Bank v. Desert View Bldg. Supplies, Inc. (In the Matter of Desert View
Bldg. Supplies, Inc.), 475 F. Supp. 693, 697 (D. Nev. 1978), aff'd 633 F.2d 225 ( 9 th Cir. i98o)
(relationship between the debtor and its creditors before and after the transfer and considering
whether debtor was able to obtain credit on normal terms); Zuk v. Hale, 330 A.2d 448, 451 (N.H.
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facts and circumstances indicating that the debtor has an unreasonably
high risk of defaulting on its obligations to creditors.'54

B.

UNREASONABLY SMALL CAPITAL AND THE ZONE OF INSOLVENCY

The concept of unreasonably small capital is similar to the "zone of
insolvency." Directors of a solvent corporation owe fiduciary duties to
the corporation and its shareholders, but not to creditors.'55 Creditors are
protected by their contractual relationship with the corporation.' 56 Courts
have found, however, that when a corporation enters the "zone" or
"vicinity" of insolvency the duties of the directors may shift from
shareholders to creditors.'57 The "zone" is a risky financial condition
short of insolvency.': Therefore, the standard for determining when a
corporation enters the zone of insolvency may be instructive in
determining when there is unreasonably small capital. In Pereira v.
Cogan, the court utilized the Moody cash flow cushion test to determine
that the debtor in question was insolvent or in the vicinity of
insolvency.' 59 Pereirais the primary zone of insolvency case that attempts
to determine when a company is in the zone.'6o
An important difference between unreasonably small capital and the

1974) (total working capital for the type of business).
154. Cf. Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co., Inc. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 302 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1997) ("A transaction leaves a company with unreasonably small capital when it creates an
unreasonablerisk of insolvency, not necessarily a likelihood of insolvency." (emphasis added)).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[A] firm's obligations to
creditors" are solely contractual). Nor do directors owe fiduciary duties to holders of convertible debt,
which have characteristics of debt and equity. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 302-04 (Del.
1988) (directors do not have fiduciary duties to holders of convertible debt absent fraud, insolvency or
other special circumstances); Lorenz v. CSX Corp., i F.3d 14o6, 1417 (3d Cir. 1993) (corporation does
not owe fiduciary duties to creditors); Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225
B.R. 646, 652 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998) ("Under Delaware law, directors of solvent corporations owe
fiduciary duties to shareholders, but not to creditors.").
156. See Steinberg, 225 B.R. at 652-53 ("Creditors... deal with corporations by entering into
contracts. Satisfaction of their claims... requires only compliance with their contracts. So long as the
corporation is solvent, they require no additional protection; by definition, a solvent corporation, no
matter how badly managed... is able to satisfy its contractual obligations.").
157. See Carrieri v. Jobs.com, Inc., 393 F.3d 508, 534 n.24 ( 5 th Cir. 2004) ("[Wjhen a corporation
reaches the 'zone of insolvency,' ... the officers and directors have an expanded fiduciary duty to all
creditors of the corporation, not just the equity holders."). But see Adelphia Commc'ns Corp. v. Rigas
(In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp.), 323 B.R. 345, 386 n.140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[D]irectors'
obligations are to the firm itself.") (citing Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772,
791 (Del. Ch. 2004)); Prod.Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 772, 776-77, 786-91 (stating that directors do not
owe a fiduciary duty to creditors when the corporation is in the zone of insolvency).
158. See Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 789-90 n.56.
159. 294 B.R. 449,509-1I (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).

i6o. See Corinne Ball, Distressed Mergers and Acquisitions; Creditors' Claims Against Directors,
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 24, 2005, at 5. But see U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. U.S. Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C.,
864 A.2d 930, 948 (Del. Ch. 2004), vacated on other grounds, No. 36, 2005 Del. LEXIS 215 (Del. June

6, 2005) ("While the so-called zone of insolvency has not been clearly defined, it is clear that whether a
company is within the zone can be a fact-intensive inquiry.").
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zone of insolvency is how the corporation gets there. If the corporation
enters the zone of insolvency because of a voluntary asset transfer made
without receiving reasonably equivalent value (i.e., as a result of a
leveraged buyout), the transaction is a voidable fraudulent conveyance
and the directors may be liable. If the corporation enters the zone of
insolvency for other reasons (i.e., because of losses not attributable to a
breach of directors' fiduciary duties) the directors are not liable.' 6' In
either case, once in the zone, directors may be liable for violations of
their possible fiduciary
duties to creditors, or for initiating fraudulent
162
asset transfers. Unlike fiduciary duty, there is no standard of care
applicable to a fraudulent conveyance: it is per se voidable.
III.
A.

PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

GENERAL APPROACH

The majority case law on unreasonably small capital, led by Moody,
does not provide an adequate method for determining when a transfer
leaves a company with unreasonably small capital. The purpose of the
unreasonable capital test of constructive fraud is to protect creditors
from an unreasonable risk of loss caused by asset transfers that leave a
company barely solvent. In such a position, shareholders have little to
lose and much to gain, while creditors have much to lose and little to
gain.
Moody's cash flow cushion test is only a partial solution. Even if
unreasonably small capital is a financial condition short of equity
insolvency, equity (balance sheet) cushion is equally as important as cash
flow cushion.' 6, If cash flow is insufficient to pay debts as they come due
(equity insolvency), a company may be able to pay its debts by selling
some or all of its assets, provided there is enough time and enough equity
cushion. The ability of a company to sell assets to pay creditors in full
depends on the fair saleable value of the assets' 64 and the amount of
161. Directors do not become liable simply because a corporation enters the zone of insolvency.
They are still subject to their duties of due care, good faith and loyalty to the corporation and its
shareholders (before entering the zone of insolvency) and to the corporation and its creditors (after
entering into the zone of insolvency).
162. An asset transfer made for inadequate consideration when a corporation is in the zone of
insolvency could arguably be both a fraudulent conveyance and a violation of the directors' fiduciary
duties.
163. See, e.g., Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc. v. Spitters (In re Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency,
Inc.), 174 B.R. 557, 591 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994) (criticizing the cash flow cushion test) ("[The cash
flow cushion] analysis tends to blur the lines between the [unreasonably small capital] and [cash flow]
tests.... The tests can be distinguished through the use of the balance sheet approach in the
[unreasonably small capital] analysis....").
164. See, e.g., Queenan, supra note 119, at 14 ("Some... decisions construe the phrase 'fair
saleable value'.., to exclude the value of illiquid assets which cannot be sold in sufficient time to pay
debts as they mature .... "). Fair saleable value is the appropriate standard, rather than theoretical fair
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liabilities. As with cash flow, there needs to be adequate cushion or
margin for error for reasonably foreseeable adverse events that could
impact asset values or the ability to sell assets.' 6' On the other hand, if a
company is able to pay its debts as they come due (is equitably solvent),
balance sheet insolvency is largely irrelevant for purposes of
unreasonably small capital, unless the company is compelled to sell or
liquidate for contractual or other reasons. Under Moody's definition of
unreasonably small capital, the unreasonably small capital test should be
whether there is sufficient cash flow cushion or equity cushion. Under
the Brandt definition of unreasonably small capital, the test should
be
66
whether there is sufficient cash flow cushion and equity cushion.'
Analysis of equity and cash flow cushion does not go far enough.
Under Brandt, unreasonably small capital means an unreasonable risk of
insolvency. '67 Since fraudulent conveyance laws are intended to protect
creditors from losses caused by unfair asset transfers, I6' it makes no sense
to confine the meaning of "insolvency" to its legal definition.' 69 There is
also no need to do so, because unreasonably small capital is not defined
by statute.'70 Further, the statutes' unreasonably small capital provisions
make no reference at all to "insolvency."
A better approach is to equate unreasonably small capital with an
unreasonable risk of loss to creditors.'7' In addition to the cash flow and
equity cushion tests, courts should look at all other facts and
circumstances to determine whether an asset transfer (made for less than
reasonably equivalent value) results in an unreasonable risk of loss to
creditors.'72 The question then becomes how to determine when the risk
of loss becomes unreasonable. One way of doing so is to follow the same
approach used by creditors in determining whether to extend credit.' 7 In
market value, because creditors will only be paid in full if the actual sales price for the assets equals or
exceeds liabilities.
165. Cf. Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, IO73 (3 d Cir. 1992).
i66. Judge Queenan's definition of unreasonably small capital, used in Brandt, is when a company
is in a weakened financial condition short of balance sheet or equity insolvency but where insolvency is
reasonably foreseeable. Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co., Inc. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288,
302 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997); Queenan, supra note II9, at i8. Under this definition, a company has
unreasonably small capital if it is balance sheet insolvent, even if is equitably solvent.
167. See Brandt, 208 B.R. at 302.
168. For purposes of this Note, an unfair asset transfer refers to a transfer where a corporation
does not receive reasonably equivalent value. Often, such a transfer will also not be entirely fair to the
corporation.
169. E.g., equitable and balance sheet insolvency.
170. Brandt, 208 B.R. at 302.
171. Cf. Zaretsky, supra note 16, at 1172-76 (fraudulent conveyance laws serve to restrain
companies from taking unreasonable risks with assets that otherwise might be available to creditors, a
purpose not originally contemplated when the laws were promulgated).
172. Presumably, courts will continue to utilize the parties' own expert testimony in analyzing
unreasonably small capital, rather than conduct its own credit analysis.
173. Creditors and ratings agencies are likely better at analyzing credit risk than courts.
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fact, an unreasonable risk of loss may be viewed as a condition under
which a creditor, dealing on arm's length terms, would no longer be
willing to extend credit. "4 A review of how credit rating agencies
evaluate undercapitalization and credit risk identifies those facts and
circumstances that may indicate an unreasonably high level of risk of
loss, and therefore the presence of unreasonably small capital.
B.

RISK ANALYSIS IN THE MARKETPLACE

Unreasonably small capital and credit risk may be a vexing problem
for the courts, but not the private sector. Creditors and analysts have
developed elaborate methodologies for evaluating a prospective debtor's
creditworthiness and the risk faced by creditors. Insight into factors that
contribute to a company's credit quality, risk of default and risk of loss
can be gleaned from organizations such as Standard & Poor's (S&P) and
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) "5 that issue credit ratings on
companies, bonds, bank loans, and other debt instruments. S&P's overall
rating methodologies shed light on the relative importance of cash flow
and equity cushion. Moody's criteria for assigning its lowest ratings
categories is particularly insightful into understanding what constitutes
unreasonably small capital.
S&P rates companies' (issuers') creditworthiness based on financial,
company and industry criteria., 6 Long-term issuer ratings range from D
(weakest) to AAA (strongest).'77 A CCC rating is highly speculative,""
potentially indicative of unreasonably high risk.'79 When rating an issuer,
cash-flow analysis is the single most important, but not only, factor.'s
174- See, e.g., Mach. Car Rental, Inc. v. Herpel (In the Matter of Multiponics, Inc.), 622 F.2d 709,
717 (5th Cir. i98o) ("Capitalization is inadequate if...
the bankrupt could not have borrowed a
similar amount of money from an informed outside source.") (citing Benjamin v. Diamond (In the
Matter of Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 703 (5th Cir. 1977)). Multiponics dealt with
undercapitalization in connection with equitable subordination and alter ego actions, while Mobile
Steel dealt with equitable subordination.
175. Moody's Investors Service is unrelated to the plaintiff Moody in Moody v. Security Pacific
Business Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1992).
176. See STANDARD & POOR'S, INC., 2005 CORPORATE RATINGS CRITERIA 8-9, 19 (2005).
177. Id. at 8. An issuer rating is based on the overall credit risk of the company as compared to a
rating on a specific security or issue.
178. Id. at 12 ("An obligation rated 'CCC' currently is vulnerable to nonpayment and is dependent
on favorable business, financial and economic conditions for the obligor to meet its financial
commitment on the obligation. In the event of adverse business, financial, or economic conditions, the
obligor is not likely to have the capacity to meet is financial commitment on the obligation.").
179. S&P's description of a CCC rating (obligor not likely to meet financial commitment in the
event of adverse conditions) seems similar to Moody's rationale for requiring a debtor to have
adequate margin for error. See Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1o56, 1073 (3d Cir. 1992).
S&P's CCC rating is equivalent to Moody's Caa rating, which is assigned when the issuer is "seriously
undercapitalized relative to its outstanding debt ... and business risk" and its "equity base is
unreasonably thin." MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE GLOBAL CREDIT RESEARCH, SPECIAL COMMENT: CREDIT
CONSIDERATIONS IN ASSIGNING A CAAI 1,
4,8 (i9).
18o. STANDARD & POORS, INC., supra note 176, at 29 ("Cash-flow analysis is the single most critical
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Other factors include business risk, industry risk (including cyclicality),
size and diversification, management, organizational culture, accounting
characteristics and information risk, financial policies, profitability,
interest and cash-flow coverage, capital structure, leverage, asset
protection and asset valuation.'"' When rating issuers, S&P will vary the
importance of each factor depending on the circumstances. ' For an
issuer strong in one area and weak in another, S&P will balance
the
8
factors.8, S&P issuer ratings focus on the likelihood of default. ,
In addition, S&P rates bank loans and other secured obligations.'
While issuer ratings focus on the likelihood of default,' 6 bank loan
ratings focus on likelihood of default and expected recovery (loss) on the
bank loan in the event of a default. 8 S&P also issues a separate recovery
rating, that only addresses recovery prospects-the likelihood of default
is irrelevant.' 8 When rating bank loans, default scenarios (i.e., was the
reason for the default due primarily to excess leverage
or underlying
'89
business weakness) and asset values are important.
When valuing assets, S&P will often value the entire business
enterprise if the business' operating assets are part of the security
package (i.e., the collateral is a going-concern business)."9 An important
determinant in deciding whether to value the overall business as a goingconcern is the likely nature of any default. 9' If a default is likely due
primarily to high leverage, S&P will tend to value the business as a goingconcern. 9' Going-concern valuations are based on expected values at the
time of default (considering the likely decline in earnings that cause the

aspect of all credit rating decisions. It takes on added importance for speculative grade issuers."

(emphasis added)). When analyzing the sufficiency of cash flow, S&P considers the amount of cash
flow available relative to debt service and other cash requirements, future working capital and capital
expenditure needs, flexibility to alter the timing of capital requirements, financial flexibility (access to
capital markets or ability to restructure existing obligations) and liquidity. Id. at 29-32.
181. Id. at 19-29.
182. See id. at t9.
183. See id.
184. See id. at ii("[I]ssuer ...rating definitions are expressed in terms of default risk ....
185. Id. at 62.
186. See supra note 184.
187. STANDARD & POORS, INC., supra note 176, at 64 ("The starting point for assigning a bank loan
rating is determining the borrower's default risk.... The analysis then proceeds to the recovery
aspects of a specific debt issue.").
I88. Id. ("[R]ecovery ratings.., purely address the recovery prospects, the likelihood of default is
irrelevant.").
189. See id. at 65-69. Recovery on a bank loan can depend on the way a company defaults. If a
company defaults because of excess leverage, secured lenders may achieve a high level of recovery if
asset values are otherwise unaffected. Underlying weakness or excessive volatility in the business or
economy overall could negatively impact asset values, resulting in a lower amount of recovery.
i9o. See id. at 66-67.
191. See id. at 67.

192. Id.
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default), not when the rating is issued. 93 Otherwise, it will look to the
liquidation values of individual assets such as in the case of a company
with a weak underlying business.'94 S&P's asset valuation methodologyfocusing on the asset's likely value in default-appears to be more
consistent with the practical nature of "fair saleable value" than the
theoretical nature of "fair market value."
Moody's Investors Service, another ratings agency, uses a similar
approach to that of S&P. 9' Its criteria for assigning a Caai rating is
particularly instructive in determining when a debtor may be left with
unreasonably small capital.' 6 Moody's describes a Caai issuer as
"seriously undercapitalized relative to its outstanding debt obligations
and its level of business risk" and notes that such a rating may be
assigned when a "company's equity base is unreasonably thin."'97 Further
characteristics of a Caai rated company include being unable to
withstand flaws in the formulation or implementation of their business
plans, weak debt coverage ratios, management team lacking experience
in the industry or running highly leveraged companies, and quality of
financial disclosure.' 8
Serious undercapitalization is a hallmark of a Caai company.'
Moody's analyzes the owners' equity contribution or market value of
equity related to its total debt, as well as the "risk inherent in [the]
business" and the "need to have a reasonable equity base to absorb
unanticipated setbacks."2" The owners' willingness (or lack thereof) to
contribute capital is a factor considered,"' as well as owners who wish to
cash out, leaving bondholders "holding the bag.""° Another important
193. STANDARD & POORS, INC., supra note 176, at 67.

194- Id.
195. See generally

MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE GLOBAL CREDIT RESEARCH, RATING METHODOLOGY:

(1998). Like S&P, Moody's views cash flow as the most
important determinant of risk. Id. at I ("Determining the predictability of future cash generation is the
primary focus of Moody's industrial company analysis."). Other factors include industry trends,
political and regulatory environment, management quality and attitude towards risk-taking, operating
and competitive position, financial position and sources of liquidity, company structure and structural
subordination and priority of claims, parent company support agreements and special event risk. Id. at
3. Moody's ratings "incorporate assessments of both the likelihood and the severity of default."
MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note 179, at 5.
196. The Caai rating is the highest rating in Moody's Caa ratings group and falls just below a B3
rating. Caa2 and Caa3 ratings are weaker than Caal. MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note 179, at
4-5197. Id. at 4, 8.
198. Id. at 4.
I99. Id. at 8.
200. Id.
201. Id. ("The willingness of equity sponsors to contribute capital both initially and in the future
can play a critical role in determining a rating.").
202. MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note 179, at 9 ("When owners cash out from the proceeds
of a note offering, bondholders are generally left to bear the entire financial burden of the leveraged
INDUSTRIAL COMPANY RATING METHODOLOGY
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factor is a company's ability to withstand defects in its business plan.2"
S&P's and Moody's ratings methodologies are helpful in analyzing
the risk of loss to a creditor caused by an unfair transfer and determining
when the risk of loss becomes unreasonable and the debtor is left with
unreasonably small capital. First, cash flow coverage, and by extension,
cash flow cushion, is very important. Second, asset coverage, and by
extension, equity cushion, is a factor, but less important, in determining
the risk of default. Since loss, not default, is the ultimate determinant of
whether creditors are harmed, the asset analysis must be taken further.
S&P bases secured debt recovery ratings on encumbered assets (those
available to it in the event of default) and the amount of the
corresponding collateralized obligation. By analogy, recovery risk borne
by unsecured creditors, those most likely to be harmed, should be based
on available assets (asset values in excess of outstanding liens) compared
to outstanding unsecured obligations. 4 When valuing assets, prospective
fair saleable value in the event of default (which may, under the
circumstances, be going-concern or liquidation values) should be used.
Finally, all other relevant facts and circumstances, such as the various
other S&P and Moody's ratings criteria, should be considered.
Financial professionals who prepare solvency analyses in leveraged
transactions commonly use a broad-based approach consistent with the
methodology advocated in this Note." The unreasonably small capital
test used is whether "the 'equity cushion' determined in the balance
recapitalization. Additionally, a company's operating and financial condition can change dramatically
when owners cash-out, and related-party transactions unwind, exposing a company's returns to market
conditions that may not be as favorable as those that previously existed.").
203. Id. at II ("[A]s leverage increases, a company's ability to withstand difficulties arising from an
aggressive business model erodes quickly. Lower rated creditors have little liquidity to absorb
losses."). Moody's cites early stage telecommunications and other concept companies as prime
examples of Caa candidates. Id. at 1i-i2.
Moody's notes that "many 'concept-or -business plan'
companies in their early stages, particularly those in the telecommunications industry, do not generate
operating earnings. These companies rely on continued access to the capital markets to finance
network construction and projected rapid growth, as well as to service existing debt." Id. at II. This
description aptly describes the situation faced by USN Communications, Inc. (see, e.g., Peltz v. Hatten,
279 B.R. 710, 745-47 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (fraudulent conveyance action arising from bankruptcy of
USN); supra notes io-i2 and accompanying text), which Moody's initially rated a Caai, and later
downgraded to Ca, where it stood as of December 31, 1998. MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note
179, at 22. USN filed for Chapter II bankruptcy on February i8, 1999. Peltz, 279 B.R. at 711. Despite
Moody's initial Caai rating, Peltz held that USN did not have unreasonably small capital. Id. at 748.
204. The drafters of the UFTA may have had a similar view of risk. See supra note so7 and
accompanying text.
205. See generally Jeffrey R. Greene & Lori M. Price, Solvency Analysis in Leveraged
Transactions,in FINANCIAL VALUATION: BUSINESSES AND BUSINESS INTERESTS 13-7, 13-tO, 13-23 to 1325 (James H. Zukin & John G. Mavredakis eds., Warren Gorham Lamont i99o). Solvency opinions
are often requested by participants in transactions, such as lenders or boards of directors, to reduce the
risk associated with fraudulent conveyances. See, e.g., Lisa Arias, Insurance Policy, DAILY DEALITHE
DEAL, Nov. 22, 2004; Aaron Pressman, Bondholders Get Tough; The Threat of FraudulentConveyance,
INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, NOV. 5, i99o, at I8.
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sheet test [is] lare enough [and] ... the 'safety margin' in the projections
[is] adequate."" Factors considered in applying the test include the
degree of sensitivity of operating cash flow to changes in key
assumptions, the "historical and expected volatility of asset values," the
"maturity structure of the company's fixed obligations," the "magnitude,
timing and nature of contingent liabilities," the "prevalent capital
structures within the industry," and the "amount of flexibility allowed by
the financial covenants in the credit agreements."2" Such financial
professionals, who are likely more concerned with professional liability
than legal precedent, will presumably use analyses and techniques that
are best suited for analyzing the likelihood that a debtor will become
insolvent.
CONCLUSION

The unreasonably small capital provisions of the UFCA, UFT'A and
Section 548 are intended to protect creditors against unfair asset
transfers that leave a company with unreasonably small capital, a
financial condition short of equitable or balance sheet insolvency. Such a
condition poses an unreasonable risk of loss to creditors. In order to
determine whether a transfer left a company in that condition, a threepart test should be applied.
First, the Mood), test should be applied to determine if the
company's cash flow2 forecasts were reasonable and, if so, whether they
left sufficient margin for error (cushion) in the event of reasonably
foreseeable difficulties, considering the company's business risks and its
obligations. Second, if there was not enough cash flow cushion, or there
was a reasonable likelihood that the company would have been
compelled to sell its assets, 2°9 the equity cushion test should be applied to
determine whether the fair saleable value of the company's assets
exceeded liabilities by a sufficient amount to enable creditors to be paid
in full in the event of reasonably foreseeable difficulties. Finally, all other
facts and circumstances should be considered (such as factors used by

206. See Greene & Price, supra note 205, at 13-6.
207.

See id. at 13-10.

208. "Cash flow" may include the proceeds from the sale of assets not necessary for the continued

operation of the business, and proceeds from debt and equity financings, provided that such sales or
financings are feasible and likely to occur. Equity financings require extra scrutiny because of the
higher level of risk.
209. A company may have a reasonable likelihood of having to sell its assets based on the maturity
structure of its debt, contractual obligations (i.e. mandatory redemption of preferred stock of private
equity investors), industry or competitive conditions, changes in management or key employees,
personal circumstances of controlling shareholders, litigation, regulatory changes, or other conditions
that suggest that a sale is likely. In the event of an asset sale, the company's liabilities, if not assumed
by the buyer, would have to be satisfied from the proceeds of the sale. If assets were insufficient, the
company would be balance sheet insolvent.
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rating agencies) that may indicate whether creditors had been subjected
to an unreasonably high risk of loss.

